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He Said, She Said: Plausible Pleadings for Reverse Title IX
Claims
James Bunster*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sexual assaults have plagued the lives of millions of Americans
each year, and college women are three times more likely to be victims
of this crime.1 Reports of sexual assault often go unreported because
the survivors fear a backlash from their perpetrators and from society.2
Survivors also feel “ashamed to come forward” or fear that nothing
will be done about it.3 Thankfully, this notion has started to subside as
an effect of the #MeToo movement, which empowered women’s
voices by standing in solidarity against sexual assault.4
In 2006, a different story captivated the country’s attention as
a Judge in North Carolina dismissed the infamous rape case of three
Duke Lacrosse players after the allegations against them were shown
*
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Research Editor, Touro Law Review. I would like to give a special thanks to my
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throughout the entire writing process.
1
Courtney Smith-Kimble, The Realities of Sexual Assault on Campus, BEST
COLLEGES, https://www.bestcolleges.com/resources/sexual-assault-on-campus/ (last
visited Nov. 1, 2020).
2
Cameron Kimble, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/sexual-assault-remains-dramatically-underreported.
3
Id.
4
See Understanding the Me Too Movement: A Sexual Harassment Awareness Guide,
MARYVILLE UNIV., https://online.maryville.edu/blog/understanding-the-me-toomovement-a-sexual-harassment-awareness-guide/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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to be false.5 The typical gender-discrimination suit, often in the
context of sports, involves a female victim against her school.6
Recently, courts have seen an increase in cases where a male student
claims that his school unfairly punished him for allegations of sexual
assault because of his gender. 7 These cases are typically referred to as
“reverse” gender discrimination claims in which the plaintiff asserts a
violation of Title IX. Title IX provides that “[n]o person shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 8
Despite all of the case law surrounding Title IX claims, there is
an inconsistent application of pleading requirements for these claims
to survive a motion to dismiss. When reviewing a motion to dismiss,
a court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 9 The Second Circuit
applies a “minimal evidence” standard that affords the student a
“temporary presumption” of discrimination, 10 while the Sixth Circuit
adheres to the plausibility standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly11 and affirmed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.12
For clarification, “reverse” Title IX claims are analyzed in the
same manner that any Title IX claim would be. These claims are
referred to as “reverse” gender-discrimination simply because a male
student is asserting the claim rather than a female. Additionally, for
the purposes of this Note, all references are to Title IX as they apply to
post-secondary educational institutions, and not as applied to K-12
schools. Finally, for the purposes of this Note, sexual misconduct
refers to any sexual violence or harassment defined as
Jen Yamato, The Stripper Who Cried ‘Rape’: Revisiting the Duke Lacrosse Case
Ten Years Later, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/thestripper-who-cried-rape-revisiting-the-duke-lacrosse-case-ten-years-later.
6
Title
IX
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions
(last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
7
Weiru Fang, Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and Subsequent Effect of ‘AntiMale Bias’ Claims in Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
467, 468 (2019).
8
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
9
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018).
10
Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 53-56 (2d Cir. 2016).
11
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
12
556 U.S. 662 (2008); Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 588.
5
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unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical
conduct of a sexual nature. Sexual violence is a form of
sexual harassment. Sexual violence, as OCR uses the
term, refers to physical sexual acts perpetrated against
a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving
consent. A number of different acts fall into the
category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual
assault, sexual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual
coercion.13
This Note will use the same definitions as provided by the U.S.
Department of Education.
Part I of this Note provides the introduction and procedural
requirements mandated by Title IX. Part II of this Note discusses the
evolving pleading requirements established by the Supreme Court as
well as the burden-shifting framework for Title VII claims established
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 14 and its progeny. Part III
provides an overview of the Second Circuit’s and the Sixth Circuit’s
conflicting standard for evaluating the sufficiency of a Title IX
complaint upon review of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).15 Finally, Part IV will argue that the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals is misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, Part IV will explain why the plausibility standard is the
best way to judge the sufficiency of a complaint, in the context of
“reverse” Title IX claims. Furthermore, this section will address the
negative ramifications for both the school and the victims of sexual
assault on college campuses that result from the Second’s Circuit’s
lower pleading standards.
A.

Title IX Procedural Requirements

Title IX requirements apply to any educational institution that
receives federal funding. 16 These requirements are not limited to
OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Sex-based Harassment, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/pro-students/issues/sexissue01.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
14
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
16
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
13
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public schools because almost every private school receives funding
through federal financial aid programs used by their students.17 Title
IX is enforced by the Office for Civil Rights, (OCR) which ensures
that schools are complying with all the mandates. 18
Once a student asserts a claim of sexual assault or harassment
and files a grievance to the school’s Title IX Coordinator, the school
is required to investigate the claim to ensure a safe environment. 19
Schools use Title IX hearings to investigate the alleged misconduct and
discipline a student if found guilty. 20 Currently, schools are free to
choose between using the preponderance of the evidence standard or
the clear and convincing evidence standard for finding culpability. 21
There are standards in place that require that the administrative Title
IX hearing be live and impartial. 22 Additionally, the accused student
must be allowed to cross-examine witnesses, challenge evidence, and
submit evidence for his defense.23 Finally, both parties must be
notified in writing of the school’s final decision and the rationale used
to reach its decision. 24 Title IX also mandates that a student has the
opportunity to appeal any disciplinary decision. 25
In recent years, numerous schools have been defending federal
lawsuits for unfairly punishing male students for sexual misconduct

17

Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
(Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.
19
What You Need to Know About Title IX Hearings, LAW OFF. OF BRIAN JONES,
LLC,
https://thelawofficeofbrianjones.com/2019/02/20/what-you-need-to-knowabout-title-ix-hearings/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
20
Id.
21
R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX rules on
Sexual
Misconduct,
BROOKINGS
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-the-department-of-educations-finaltitle-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct.
22
U.S. Department of Education Launches New Title IX Resources for Students,
Institutions as Historic New Rule Takes Effect, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-launches-newtitle-ix-resources-students-institutions-historic-new-rule-takes-effect.
These
hearings must be conducted in real time, but may be done through video conferencing
to protect the victims. Id.
23
Id.
24
Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
25
Id.
18
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without sufficient evidence. 26 In this situation, the male student’s best
recourse would be asserting a Title IX claim against his school by
pleading an erroneous outcome of the administrative hearing due to the
gender-based bias of the disciplinary panel. 27
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A.

The Evolution of Pleading Requirements

Shortly after the Civil Rights Movement began to gain traction
in the United States, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Brown v. Board of Education,28 where it held that segregation of
students in public schools on the basis of “color” was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and overturned the “separate but equal”
doctrine.29 Five months later, the Supreme Court decided Conley v.
Gibson,30 which involved a discrimination claim by railway employees
against their union for firing black workers in order to replace them
with their white counterparts. 31 The workers’ complaint alleged the
union fired or demoted forty-five African-Americans under the pretext
that their jobs were eliminated, but the union did not actually eliminate
those jobs and hired forty-five white workers to fill their “eliminated”
positions.32 The union moved to dismiss the complaint for “fail[ure]
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 33 In its decision,
the Supreme Court established the “notice” pleading standard by
holding a complaint does not need to set forth detailed facts, but rather
put the defendant on “fair notice” of the claim and the ”grounds on
which it rests.”34 The Court noted that this lower standard would
permit claims to move onto the discovery phase in order to “facilitate
a proper decision [based] on the merits.”35 Additionally, the Court held
26

Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE HIGHER
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-lookfederal-courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings.
27
Id.
28
347 U.S. 483 (1957).
29
Id. at 495.
30
355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
31
Id. at 43.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 47.
35
Id. at 48.
ED
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that a complaint is sufficient unless it is clearly evident that “no set of
facts” would support the claim.36
Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard was precedent until it
was abrogated in 2007, when the Supreme Court decided Twombly.37
Twombly involved a claim brought by a group of subscribers against
telephone and internet service providers for violating § 1 of the
Sherman Act.38 The complaint alleged that the telecommunication
providers conspired with each other to eliminate competition by
showing the providers’ parallel conduct of raising the price of their
service, inferring these service providers had entered into a contract
with each other to not compete by offering lower prices. 39 The
Supreme Court noted that the parallel conduct of the service providers,
absent any factual context suggesting an agreement, was insufficient
to establish an agreement between the service providers because it was
a mere legal conclusion. 40 “[W]e do not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” 41 The Court explained that the parallel
behavior described in the complaint was likely the result of market
forces.42
The Supreme Court addressed the plausibility standard again
two years later in Iqbal.43 This case involved a Muslim man who was
arrested and detained in the United States on criminal charges in the
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.44 The man asserted
a discrimination claim against federal officials, Robert Muller, former
Director of the FBI, and John Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the
United States.45 Specifically, the complaint alleged both Muller and
Ashcroft “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject’ respondent to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin

36

Id. at 45-46.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007).
38
Id. at 550.
39
Id. at 551-52.
40
Id. at 564-65.
41
Id. at 570.
42
Id. at 568.
43
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
44
Id. at 666.
45
Id.
37
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and for no legitimate penological interest.” 46 The complaint further
alleged that Ashcroft was the “‘principal architect’ of the policy” and
that Muller was instrumental in adopting and implementing it.47 The
Court applied a two prong test for establishing a sufficient pleading by
removing legal conclusions from the complaint, and then determining
if the remaining factual allegations supported a plausible inference of
discriminatory purpose.48 The Court noted that the allegations in the
complaint were simply a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a
discrimination claim and were mere legal conclusions.49 The Court
added that because the claims were legal conclusions, they were not
entitled to the “presumption of truth.”50 After removing the legal
conclusions from the complaint, the Court held that the pleading did
not contain sufficient facts to plausibly allege discrimination by Muller
and Ashcroft.51
Iqbal affirmed that Twombly’s holding applied to all pleadings
and was not limited to anti-trust claims. This plausibility standard was
designed to protect defendants from meritless claims, where a plaintiff
attempts only to find useful information during the expensive
discovery process.52
B.

Burden-Shifting Framework of McDonnell and its
Progeny

In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green,53 and established the burden-shifting framework for a Title
VII claim.54 Title VII is an anti-discrimination law that prohibits workplace discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,” and was recently expanded to include sexual orientation and
gender identity.55 In McDonnell, a mechanic was laid off of work,
after several years of employment, because of a reduction in the
46

Id. at 669 (quoting First Am. Compl., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No.
04–CV–1809)).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 680.
49
Id. at 681.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 687.
52
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
53
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54
Id. at 802-04.
55
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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employer’s work force. 56 The employee was an active member of the
civil rights movement and thought his lay-off was racially motivated,
so he arranged a public protest against the corporation. 57 The
mechanic participated in a protest that illegally obstructed traffic as
well as a “lock in.”58 Three weeks after the protests, the corporation
publicly advertised an opening for a qualified mechanic and the former
employee applied for the position. 59 The corporation denied the
application based on the mechanic’s involvement in the protests. 60 The
mechanic filed a lawsuit asserting he was denied employment based
on his race, which violated Title VII protection, and his participation
in the protest.61 The corporation asserted that he was not re-hired based
on his involvement in the unlawful protest and race was not a factor in
its decision.62 The Court held that in Title VII claims, the plaintiff
carries the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish a non-discriminatory reason,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish the nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.63 Here, the
case was remanded to the district court to allow the mechanic to
demonstrate that the corporation’s reason for not re-hiring was a
pretext for actual discrimination. 64
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A.,65 to address the issue “whether a complaint in an employment
discrimination lawsuit must contain specific facts establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination under the framework” established in
McDonnell.”66 Here, the Court unanimously held that a pleading did
not need to “contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case” but
rather “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”67 It is important to note that this case was decided under the
56

McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 794.
Id. at 794-95.
58
Id. at 795 (“[A] ‘lock-in’ took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on
the front door of a building to prevent the occupants . . . from leaving.”).
59
Id. at 796.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 801.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 802-04.
64
Id. at 806.
65
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
66
Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. (8)(a)(2)).
67
Id.
57
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“no set of facts” pleading standard established in Conley and not the
current plausibility standard. In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court
expressly noted that “[t]he prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas,
however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”68
Looking forward, it is paramount to understand the evolution
of pleading standards from Conley’s abrogated “no set of facts”
standard to the current plausibility standard established in Twombly
and Iqbal along with the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell.
Part III will focus on the Second and Sixth Circuit’s inconsistent
application of these standards in the context of Title IX claims at the
12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss phase.
III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR TITLE IX
CLAIMS

This section will provide an analysis of both the Second and
Sixth Circuits’ inconsistent interpretation of Swierkiewicz and the
fundamentally different pleading standards that stem from the
inconsistent holdings. This section will also focus on how the two
Circuits apply these different pleading standards to “reverse” Title IX
gender-discrimination claims in separate, yet substantially similar
situations, where a school unfairly punished a male student for alleged
claims of sexual assault.
A.

The Second Circuit’s Minimal Evidence Standard

Although “reverse” Title IX claims have gained attention in
recent years, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed this
concept in 1994, when deciding the sufficiency of a student’s
complaint in Yusuf v. Vassar College.69 Here, a male student was
“brutally attacked” by his roommate, and when the student filed
criminal charges, the roommate’s girlfriend claimed that the student
sexually harassed her on multiple occasions.70 The school found the
student guilty of sexual harassment and suspended him for a year. 71
The student brought a Title IX action against his school on the ground

68

Id. at 510.
35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).
70
Id. at 712.
71
Id. at 713.
69
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that his school’s decision constituted gender discrimination.72 The
Second Circuit noted that “Title IX bars the imposition of university
discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to
discipline.”73 The court separated gender discrimination claims into
two categories, erroneous outcome and selective enforcement. 74 An
erroneous outcome claim involves an innocent student who was
wrongfully punished for sexual misconduct. 75 A selective enforcement
claim asserts that, regardless of fault, the severity of the punishment
was affected by the student’s gender. 76
At the time this case was decided, the court adhered to the
abrogated “no set of facts” pleading standard established in Conley.77
The complaint required a fairly low burden of proof and would have
satisfied an erroneous outcome claim if it “allege[d] particular facts
sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the
outcome of the disciplinary proceeding” and a “causal connection
between the flawed outcome and gender bias.” 78 The school did not
allow the student to introduce evidence that proved he was in the
infirmary on the date of the alleged sexual harassment or call witnesses
that showed the roommate’s girlfriend had an ulterior motive for
claiming sexual harassment. 79 The court ultimately held that the
student’s complaint cast doubt on the outcome of the school’s
proceeding.80 Additionally, the causal connection was satisfied
because the school’s prosecution of males for sexual misconduct
“’historically and systematically’ and ‘invariably found [males] guilty,
regardless of evidence, or lack thereof.’”81
The Second Circuit created the minimal evidence standard in
2015, when it interpreted Swierkiewicz in the Title VII case, Littlejohn
v. City of New York.82 Here, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
deviated from the plausibility standard for pleadings, when it held that
a Title VII complaint only required a “minimal inference of
72

Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 713.
78
Id. at 715.
79
Id. at 712-13.
80
Id. at 715.
81
Id. at 716.
82
795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015).
73
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discriminatory motivation.”83 The court attempted to reconcile its
decision with Iqbal, by noting the Supreme Court’s holding was
broad.84 Additionally, the court explained that Iqbal did not apply to
cases that fall under the McDonnell burden-shifting framework, and by
further noting that a decision otherwise would be inconsistent with
Swierkiewicz.85 The Second Circuit stated that “[t]o the same extent
that the McDonnell Douglas temporary presumption reduces the facts
a plaintiff would need to show to defeat a motion for summary
judgment prior to the defendant’s furnishing of a non-discriminatory
motivation, that presumption also reduces the facts needed to be
pleaded under Iqbal.”86
After the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Second Circuit
decided to readdress the sufficiency of a complaint in Title IX claims
in Doe v. Columbia University. 87 This case involved a male student
who was suspended from school for eighteen months after a school
proceeding found him guilty of non-consensual sex with a female
student.88 The male student adamantly claimed the encounter was
consensual and sued the school for gender discrimination. 89 The
Second Circuit completely deviated from the “plausibility” standard
established in Twombly and Iqbal when it held the male student’s
complaint “plead[ ] sufficient specific facts giving at least the
necessary minimal support to a plausible inference of sex
discrimination to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”90
In Columbia University, the Second Circuit justified the link
between the Title VII analysis and the Title IX claim by noting how
factually similar the claims are and how it has consistently interpreted
Title IX claims with Title VII case law.91 Finally, the court added that
it implicitly adopted the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
when it decided Yusuf and “made [it] clear that Title VII cases provide
the proper framework for analyzing Title IX discrimination claims.” 92

83

Id. at 310.
Id. at 309-10.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 310.
87
831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016).
88
Id. at 52.
89
Id. at 53.
90
Id. at 56.
91
Id. at 55.
92
Id. at 55-56, 59.
84
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The Second Circuit held that the male student sufficiently
pleaded specific facts to plausibly show a minimal inference that the
school acted with a “pro-female, anti-male bias” with respect to the
student’s hearing, the school’s punishment, and their rejection of his
appeal.93 There was evidence that the bias was endorsed by the school
in response to allegations by students and the press that the school did
not adequately investigate or punish male students for sexual assault.94
Here, the school never sought any witness to corroborate the male
student’s version of events that the female engaged in consensual sex
with him.95 Additionally, there was no evidence introduced that the
female was coerced and the school relied on her unsupported
accusation.96 The court noted that when the evidence is clearly in favor
of one side yet the school rules in favor of the other, without reason, it
would be plausible to infer the decision was “influenced by bias.” 97
B.

Sixth Circuit and the Iqbal Standard

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently applied the
plausibility standard, established in Twombly and Iqbal, to pleading
requirements without modification for Title IX claims.98 The Sixth
Circuit expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s modified pleading
standard of “minimal plausible inference.” 99 The primary reason for
the inconsistent application of pleading requirements is attributed to
the two Circuits’ different interpretation of Swierkiewicz, which both
Circuits still recognize as good law.100
In Keys v. Humana, Inc.,101 the Sixth Circuit did not interpret
Swierkiewicz as a pleading requirement but rather an evidentiary
standard for a prima facie case. 102 Here, an employee claimed a Title
VII violation against her employer alleging termination based on
93

Id. at 56.
Id.
95
Id. at 57.
96
Id.
97
Id. The Second Circuit could have reached the same result under the plausibility
standard of Iqbal and Twombly if the student pleaded an erroneous outcome theory
of liability. Infra, Section IV.B.⁋7.
98
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Colum. Univ.,
831 F.3d at 56).
99
Id. at 589.
100
Id.
101
684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012).
102
Id. at 609.
94
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race.103 The employee appealed the district court’s decision to dismiss
her Title VII claim.104 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately
held that the employee’s complaint was plausible on its face, therefore,
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 105
The Sixth Circuit explained that Twombly and Iqbal did not
change Swierkiewicz’s holding because Swierkiewicz “‘did not change
the law of pleading,’ but simply reemphasized that application of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at the pleading stage ‘was
contrary to the Federal Rules’ structure of liberal pleading
requirements.”106 The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff in a Title VII
case must establish sufficient facts to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal to
survive a motion to dismiss.107 Additionally, it is important to note
that the Sixth Circuit recognizes that the Twombly and Iqbal standard
is not to be interpreted “so narrowly as to be the death of notice
pleading” but requires a plaintiff’s allegations to be plausible.108
The Sixth Circuit readdressed pleading requirements for Title
IX in Doe v. Miami University,109 which involved a Title IX claim by
a male student who was suspended after his school found him guilty
of sexually assaulting a female student. 110 His complaint alleged
erroneous outcome, among other theories of liability, and stated that
he could not remember the events. 111 Additionally, the female
student’s written statement was inconsistent with her testimony at the
administrative hearing. 112
The Sixth Circuit found that the
inconsistency coupled with the lack of explanation by the school
regarding how they resolved the inconsistency, satisfied the first prong
of casting “articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the
disciplinary hearing.”113
The male student also showed a “causal connection between
the flawed outcome and gender bias” by presenting statistical evidence
103

Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 608; the claim involved both a Title VII claim and a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
105
Id. at 610.
106
Id. at 609 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
107
Id. at 610.
108
Id.
109
882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018).
110
Id. at 584.
111
Id. at 592.
112
Id.
113
Id.
104
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which clearly showed a “pattern of gender-based decision-making.”114
He alleged facts that showed every male student who was accused of
sexual misconduct that year was found guilty.115 Additionally, the vast
majority of students that were found guilty by the school, in the
previous three years, had “male first-names.”116 Finally, his attorney
submitted an affidavit that stated he “represent[ed] many students in
Miami University’s disciplinary proceedings, [and] describe[d] a
pattern of the University perusing investigations concerning male
students, but not female students.”117 The court also noted that the
school “faced external pressures” to vigorously adjudicate perpetrators
of sexual misconduct by the federal government, specifically noting
the “Dear Colleague Letter” and private lawsuits. 118
Here, the Sixth Circuit held that the male student sufficiently
pleaded factual allegations that casted doubt on his adjudication
proceeding and coupled with the external pressures the school faced,
his complaint plausibly supported an inference of gender-bias
decision-making.119
IV.

PROPOSAL TO FOLLOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

This section proposes that the best solution for these different
approaches would be to follow the Sixth Circuit. There is strong
evidence that the Second Circuit’s key case to support its minimal
evidence standard is based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court
precedent. Furthermore, the plausibility standard is appropriate
because any student who is wrongfully punished by his school would
already have access to everything he needs to plausibly allege genderdiscrimination. Finally, allowing a lower pleading standard would
have harmful economic effects for the school and devastating mental
health effects on the female victims of sexual misconduct.
There is no doubt that there are cases where a public school
unfairly adjudicated a male student on the basis of his gender. 120
Adhering to the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Twombly and
114

Id. at 593.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. (quoting Am. Compl., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) (No.
1:15–CV–00605)).
118
Id. at 594.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 584.
115
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Iqbal does not bar a chance at recovery. 121 In the Sixth Circuit, any
individuals who believes they have been found guilty in a university
disciplinary proceeding based on their gender has at least four different
theories of liability available to them: selective enforcement, deliberate
indifference, hostile environment, and erroneous outcome. 122 It is
important to remember that a student’s claim of gender discrimination
will survive a motion to dismiss if the factual allegations assert “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 123
The first theory, selective enforcement, requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that an individual, of opposite gender, was in a
circumstance sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s and was treated more
favorably.124 The second theory, deliberate indifference, requires
plaintiff to “demonstrate that an official of the institution who had
authority to institute corrective measures had actual notice of and was
deliberately indifferent to the misconduct” 125 Additionally, for a
student’s claim, plaintiff must also allege that the “harassment [was]
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively
bar[ed] the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” 126
The third theory of liability is hostile environment, where a “plaintiff
must allege that his educational experience was ‘permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of the victim’s’
educational environment.’”127
The last theory, and by far the most successful theory of
liability, is erroneous outcome.128 “To plead an erroneous-outcome
121

Id.
Id. at 589-90.
123
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
124
Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 Fed. Appx. 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2003).
125
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589 (quoting Mallory, 76 Fed. Appx. at 638).
126
Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
127
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 590 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21 (1993)).
128
Id. at 593-94; see Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018). The court
held that a student successfully pleaded erroneous outcome because the school
discredited all male testimony and exclusively credited female testimony. Id. The
student also pleaded that external pressure on the school to quickly adjudicate Title
IX claims led to his punishment, therefore, the student claim was plausible. Id. at
586-87. Similarly, in Doe v. Oberlin College, 963 F.3d 580, 586-88 (6th Cir. 2020),
the court held that a student sufficiently pleaded erroneous outcome because he
pleaded facts that casted a grave doubt to the school’s decision as a matter of common
sense because of clear procedural irregularities. The Sixth Circuit’s erroneous
122
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claim, a plaintiff must allege: ‘(1) facts sufficient to cast some
articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary
proceeding’ and (2) a ‘particularized . . . causal connection between
the flawed outcome and gender bias.’”129
Allowing a claim, that only shows minimal evidence of
discrimination, to survive a motion to dismiss is inappropriate because
a student would already have access to all of the information he would
need to plausibly establish sex-based discrimination. Furthermore, the
potential ramification for allowing potentially meritless claims to
proceed into discovery will have a negative effect on the school and
the female victims. This would defeat the purpose of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal that directed the courts “to act
as gatekeepers and to take a hard look at the pleadings before opening
the doors to expensive pretrial discovery.” 130
A.

Second Circuit Misinterpreted Swierkiewicz

Although drawing the analogy between Title IX and Title VII
is logical because of the similar legislative intent of the statutes to
protect against discrimination, the Second Circuit was incorrect when
it held in Littlejohn, that McDonnell and Swierkiewicz lowered the
pleading requirement for Title VII claims. The Supreme Court in
Swierkiewicz expressly noted that it had “never indicated that the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case under [McDonnell]
also apply to the pleading standards that plaintiffs must satisfy in order
to survive a motion to dismiss.”131 The only explanation the Second
Circuit gave for its interpretation was that Iqbal was broad and did not
apply to all cases, and that a ruling otherwise would be contradictory
to Swierkiewicz.132 A fundamental problem with the Second Circuit’s
logic is that the Supreme Court expressly addressed this scenario in the
lengthy opinion of Twombly which is typically read with Iqbal.133 The
Supreme Court cleared up any possible confusion by reiterating that
outcome theory of liability was taken from the Second Circuit’s decision in Yusuf,
which the Second Circuit abandoned after adopting the burden-shifting framework
of McDonnell. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589.
129
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592 (quoting Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. Appx. 437,
452 (6th Cir. 2016)).
130
Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 116 (2012).
131
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
132
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2015).
133
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007).
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the Second Circuit’s decision in Swierkiewicz was reversed because
the court had “impermissibly applied what amounted to be a
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege
‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim.” 134 The
Supreme Court’s language is explicitly clear when it noted that its
holding in Twombly does “not require heightened fact pleadings of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is
plausible on its face.”135
The Second Circuit is clearly following its own interpretation
and logic that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
the Second Circuit’s ability to justify its rationale on lowering the
pleading standard in Title IX claims is dependent on Littlejohn, which
is fundamentally inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
B.

Discovery is Not Required to Establish Plausibility

Supporters of the Second Circuit’s decision argue the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell is appropriate in Title IX
cases because it allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss at the
initial phase on the case, therefore, allowing him access to discovery
materials to prove gender discrimination.136 However, if a student
pleads erroneous outcome, he will already have access to all the
information required to establish the claim, without discovery.
Remember, an erroneous outcome complaint has two prongs.137 The
student must allege facts that “cast some articulable doubt on the
accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding” and show a
“causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender bias.” 138
In Doe v. Miami University, the student pleaded facts that
discredited his disciplinary proceeding by referencing his own
testimony, witness statements, and the written decision from the
hearing, thus satisfying the first prong. 139 Title IX mandates that
schools provide an accused student with written notice of the
complaint and its final decision after the hearing, which must contain
the school’s rationale for its decision, as well as a chance to review all
134

Id. at 570 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514).
Id.
136
Fang, supra note 7, at 487-88.
137
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2018).
138
Id.
139
Id.
135
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of the relevant evidence during his proceeding and an opportunity to
appeal its decision. 140 If the school complies with these Title IX
mandates then the accused student already has access to all the relevant
information needed to cast doubt on his proceeding. It is extremely
doubtful that a school would withhold these documents and blatantly
violate the mandates of Title IX because non-compliance would risk
the loss of federal funding.141 If the school did withhold these
documents, it would be clear evidence of procedural irregularities. The
Sixth Circuit has noted that procedural irregularities during the
adjudication hearing, such as a lack of notice to the involved parties,
unexplained or uncommunicated delays in adjudication, or a lack of
impartial treatment, would constitute strong evidence of gender bias. 142
The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, when it held that
procedural irregularities in the adjudication process sufficiently
implied gender bias.143 If a student was unfairly adjudicated by his
school, he could plausibly cast doubt on his proceeding without
advancing into discovery regardless of his school’s compliance with
Title IX mandates.
The second prong is also within the student’s ability, by
showing a causal connection between the school’s flawed outcome and
gender bias. A student can plausibly allege that the school faced
external pressure to quickly adjudicate sexual crimes or risk losing
federal funding, with the “Dear Colleague Letter” and the surrounding
circumstances.144 Additionally, he could compile statistical evidence
that showed a pattern of finding males guilty of sexual offenses. Taken
together, courts can plausibly infer the causal connection with the
flawed outcome and gender bias. 145
In 2011, under the Obama administration, the United States
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) released the
“Dear Colleague Letter” which provided troubling statistics published
by the National Institute of Justice, such as, one in five women are

140

U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., TITLE IX FINAL RULE OVERVIEW, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 23, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-overview.pdf (last visited
Nov. 20, 2020).
141
Title IX, supra note 24.
142
Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020).
143
Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 37 (2d Cir. 2019).
144
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d at 587; Doe v. Baum, 903
F.3d 575, 586-87 (6th Cir. 2018).
145
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592; Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d at 587.
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sexually assaulted while in college. 146 OCR’s letter instructed schools
that receive federal funding, to investigate and adjudicate sexual
assault claims by using the preponderance of evidence standard and
advised that a typical investigation takes approximately sixty days. 147
The letter also outlined that failure to comply with its guidelines would
result in the loss of federal funding for the violating school.148
In 2017, under the Trump administration, the OCR rescinded
the “Dear Colleague Letter.” 149 The rescission letter asserted that the
2011 letter “[placed] improper pressure upon universities to adopt
procedures’. . . for resolving allegations that ‘lack[ed] the most basic
elements of fairness [for the accused.]’” 150 Additionally, OCR no
longer required schools to use the preponderance of the evidence
standard but allowed them to decide the acceptable standard to use. 151
Despite the Trump Administration’s rescission of the “Dear Colleague
Letter,” courts are still citing to its effects of pressure on schools to
vigorously combat sexual assault or risk losing federal funds. 152
Moving forward, President Joe Biden has vowed to reverse the Trump
Administration’s rules regarding sexual assault investigations, which
will only strengthen the argument for external pressure.153
Additionally, a student would already have access to the
school’s sexual-crime statistics pursuant to the Clery Act.154 This
federal statute mandates that any school that receives federal funding
must collect, publish, and disseminate statistics for the past three years
regarding every sexual offense reported to campus security or law
enforcement.155 Although the Clery Act does not require schools to
disclose identifiable information, a student can request the final
decision of any disciplinary proceedings where a student was found
146

See OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights, Russlynn Ali, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
147
Id. at 11-12.
148
Id. at 16.
149
OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Sept. 22, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.
150
Id. at 2-3.
151
Id.
152
Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020).
153
Erica L. Green, Biden’s Education Department Will Move Fast to Reverse Betsy
DeVos’s
Policies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/politics/biden-education-devos.html.
154
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i)(II).
155
Id.
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guilty of a sex offense, without consent of the perpetrator. 156 This final
decision must reveal the perpetrator’s name, violation committed,
sanction, and any evidence that supports the sanction. 157 This
information can be used to create the statistical evidence referenced in
Doe v. Miami University.158 Finally, in the age of social media, it
would also be easy to access any public criticism of the school for not
perusing sexual assault allegations with a simple Google search, which
has been a factor in determining the causal connection. 159 If a school
is engaged in gender-based decision making with regard to disciplinary
proceedings, any victim of reverse gender-discrimination has access to
enough facts to plausibly support his claim without access to
discovery.
The Second Circuit could have achieved the same result if it
required the Iqbal pleading standard of plausibility. In Doe v.
Columbia University, the student essentially pleaded erroneous
outcome by alleging facts that show the clear procedural irregularities
during his administrative hearing, thus, satisfying the first prong. 160
He also alleged facts that show the causal connection between his
flawed outcome and gender-bias by stating the school was combating
public criticism from the press for ignoring females’ complaints of
sexual assault in the past. 161 These facts coupled with the external
pressures from the government to combat sexual assault would clearly
satisfy the second prong, and allow the student to survive a motion to
dismiss. In this case, all the facts the student pleaded were already in
his possession or easily accessible through means outside of the
discovery process.

156

34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(14) (2020). This statute is an exception to the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which prohibits a school from
disclosing a student’s disciplinary records without the student’s consent. Id.;
Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities. U.S. DEP’T OF ED., (Oct.
2007), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/postsec.html.
157
34 C.F.R. § 99.39 (2020).
158
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018).
159
Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).
160
Id. at 56.
161
Id.
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Ramifications of a Lower Pleading Requirement

Upon first impression, it would be reasonable to think the
Second Circuit’s burden-shifting framework is harmless because once
the initial “minimal evidence” burden is met and the school states a
non-discriminatory reason for the disciplinary action, the student’s
presumption of discrimination disappears. 162 The effects of the Second
Circuit’s decision will lead to increased settlements due to the tangible
and intangible cost of litigation as well as negatively impacting the
mental health of the victimized women.
Once the student’s minimal evidence is met and survives a
motion to dismiss, discovery will ensue. Schools must “allocate
precious time, energy, and resources to meet the new federal
guidelines” when handling Title IX claims and now have to pay for the
cost of a potentially meritless lawsuit. 163 This undoubtedly takes away
from the time, resources, and support that should go to the victim of a
campus sexual assault. It is no secret that when a claim is allowed to
survive a motion to dismiss and proceed into discovery, there is higher
litigation expense and chance of settlement. Discovery expenses
typically comprise half of the litigation expense. 164
In addition to the monetary cost of proceeding with the case,
such litigation would involve a significant amount of negative
publicity.165 In 2016, the University of Tennessee settled a Title IX
case for $2.48 million dollars. 166 Raja Jubran, University of Tennessee
Board Vice Chairman, said with regard to the settlement, “[o]ne side
ultimately would have won in court several years from now, and we
felt confident about our legal position, but I truly believe that both sides
would have lost.”167 She went on to add, “[t]he intangible costs of
emotional stress to those involved and the distraction to all of our
162

Id. at 54.
Greta Anderson, New Requirements, More Costs, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 10,
2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/10/community-collegesburdened-new-title-ix-regulations.
164
Bethany A Corbin, Riding The Wave Or Drowning?: An Analysis Of Gender Bias
And Twombly/Iqbal In Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2665, 2711 (2017).
165
Anita Wadhwani, Settling Sex Assault Lawsuits Cost Universities Millions,
TENNESSEAN
(July
6,
2016),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/07/06/settling-sex-assault-lawsuitscosts-universities-millions/86756078/.
166
Id.
167
Id.
163
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positive progress at UT, over and above the actual legal cost, would
have been exorbitant.”168 It is clear that there is a strong desire to avoid
litigation. This desire inevitably coerces schools to settle Title IX
claims quickly and quietly outside of the courtroom.
Sexual assaults on college campuses have risen in the past few
years.169 The Association of American Universities (AAU) announced
that its 2019 survey of over 181,752 students revealed a thirteen
percent increase of sexual assaults from its 2015 survey.170
Additionally, women are disproportionately affected compared to their
male counterparts.171 According to the Justice Department’s report of
sexual assault on school campuses, roughly eighty percent of sexual
assaults go unreported.172 The Center for Public Integrity conducted a
yearlong investigation on sexual assaults on college campuses and
found that “students deemed ‘responsible’ for alleged sexual assaults .
. . can face little or no consequence for their acts.”173 Underreporting
coupled with a higher rate of perpetrators settling with schools for
gender-discrimination will have a serious impact on victimized
women’s mental health because the victims will see their perpetrator’s
punishment lifted for the sole reason of avoiding litigation. 174
There is no doubt that women who have been sexually
assaulted suffer from a range of trauma, such as post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), eating disorders, substance abuse problems, anxiety,
depression and other serious social and emotional problems. 175 When
the perpetrators go unpunished, it sends a strong message to victimized
168

Id.
Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Misconduct,
ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS. (Jan 1, 2020), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAUFiles/Key-Issues/CampusSafety/Revised%20Aggregate%20report%20%20and%20appendices%201-7_(0116-2020_FINAL).pdf.
170
Id. at 7.
171
Id.
172
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248471, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION
AMONG
COLLEGE-AGE-FEMALES,
1995-2013
(2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Andrew Van Dam, Less Than 1% Of Rapes Lead To Felony Convictions. At Least
89% Of Victims Face Emotional And Physical Consequences, WASH. POST. (Oct. 6,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/06/less-thanpercent-rapes-lead-felony-convictions-least-percent-victims-face-emotionalphysical-consequences.
169
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women that they were not believed when they came forward which
tends to lead to “secondary victimization.” 176 The lower pleading
standard will inevitably lead to more cases settling, resulting in more
perpetrators staying in school with their victims, and causing more
harm to the victims.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although “reverse” gender discrimination claims are not a new
phenomenon, they have clearly increased in recent years. The current
Circuit split is an important issue and is ripe for the Supreme Court to
address and establish the proper pleading requirements for Title IX
claims. By no means does this Note seek to jeopardize the avenue of
recourse of an alleged victim of “reverse” gender discrimination, but a
clear and uniform standard should be applied to these federal claims.
The Second Circuit relies on Littlejohn, to support its “minimal
evidence” standard but its holding expressly conflicts with Supreme
Court precedent. Additionally, there is no necessity for courts to allow
a lower pleading requirement because a student already has access to
all the facts he would need to plausibly assert his claim of gender
discrimination. Finally, allowing a lower pleading standard for
“reverse” Title IX claims will have serious ramifications for the school
and the victims of sexual misconduct. In the interest of justice, this
Note offers guidance on why the Second Circuit’s minimal evidence
standard should be abandoned and why the Sixth Circuit’s pleading
standard should be adopted.

176

See Top Ten Things Advocates Need To Know, UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RES. ON
VIOLENCE
AGAINST
WOMEN
(Dec.
2011),
https://opsvaw.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/07_Rape_Prosecution.pdf.
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